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C.: Ejectment--"Common Grantor" and "Common Source" Distinguished

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

We are pleased to report that on certiorari the United States
Supreme Court, reversing the court of appeals, held, an attorney
is not an "officer" of the court within the meaning of § 401 (2). The
court found it unnecessary to decide whether petitioner was engaged in an "official transaction," thereby going even further than
was suggested at 58 W. VA. L. REv. 88. Mr. Justice Black, writing
for the majority explained that the statute applies only to conventional court officers such as marshalls, bailiffs, court clerks or judges.
The congressional intent in framing this statute was to curtail the
power of the court to punish for contempt, so that it should be
strictly construed. Cammer v. United States, 76 Sup. Ct. 456 (1956).
M. J. P.

EJECTMENT-"COMMON GRANTOR" AND "ComxmoiON SOURCE" Dis-

Tnuism.-In 1900, A conveyed Whiteacre to 0, and in 1909 B3

conveyed Blackacre, an adjoining tract, to 0. 0 deeded Blackacrc
to P in 1924, without setting forth the courses and distances of the
boundary between Blackacre and Whiteacre. Whiteacre was devised by 0 in 1935, and the devisees conveyed to D in 1949, describing the boundary by courses and distances. A discrepancy
existed as to the boundary, based on the description in D's deed
and the field notes of A, said notes being on record. Apparently 0
transferred both tracts by the same descriptions as she had received
them. D entered the tract as described by the notes of A, and P
brought ejectment, proving his title back to 0. Verdict for P reversed, case remanded and new trial awarded. Held, that while a
plaintiff in an ejectment action need only prove his title back to a
common source, the terms "common source" and "common grantor"
are not synonymous and interchangeable, and the rule does not
apply when it affirmatively appears that the real dispute between
the parties involves the location of a boundary between two distinct
tracts of land, one of which the common grantor derived from one
source and conveyed to P or his predecessor in title and the other
of which the common grantor derived from another source and
conveyed to D or his predecessor in title. Toppins v. Oshel, 89
S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1955).
As a general rule, plaintiff in an ejectment action must trace
an unbroken chain of title to the state, or establish title by adverse
possession. Furbee v. Underwood, 107 W. Va. 85, 147 S.E. 472
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(1929); Low v. Settle, 32 W. Va. 600, 9 S.E. 922 (1889). An inportant exception to the rule is that when both parties claim title
from a common source, each is estopped to deny the validity of
the title so derived. Winding Gulf Colliery Co. v. Campbell, 72
W. Va. 449, 78 S.E. 384 (1913); McClung v. Echols, 5 W. Va. 204
(1872). The reason for this estoppel is that neither party should
be allowed to assume the inconsistent position of claiming both
under and against the same title. Summerfield v. White, 54 W. Va.
311, 46 S.E. 154 (1903); Mclung v. Echols, supra. The court
distinguished the factual situation in the principal case and held
that this exception to the general rule had no application, as there
is no inconsistency in allowing the defendant to attack the title
of the common grantor, as defendant is not claiming under the
same title as the plaintiff. The court relied on Jennings v. Marston,
121 Va. 79, 92 S.E. 821 (1917) as authority for the point here discussed. There, plaintiff proved title back to 0, who had also owned
the tract defendant claimed. This was held insufficient proof of
title to support an action of ejectment, as the common grantor had
acquired title from different sources and had conveyed them by
separate deeds. The opinion in the instant case used almost identical
language with that of the Virginia court in assigning reasons for
the distinction; i.e., that the mere fact that a predecessor in title
held two deeds to two separate but adjoining tracts, is not alone
sufficient to make him a common source of title.
Few cases have made the distinction in question. In Butt v.
Mastin, 148 Ala. 321, 39 So. 217 (1905), the common grantor had
acquired title to an entire subdivision by a single conveyance, but
the conveyance was of numbered lots. It was said that this was
not sufficient to establish a common source so as to estop the defendant from attacking plaintiff's title. The court reasoned that an
admission of the common grantors title as to part was not an admission of his title to the whole, and that it might be said that defendant purchased the part to which he considered the grantor had
good title, and did not buy the balance because he considered the
title bad. This is somewhat analogous to the situation where A
conveys the timber on certain land to B, and then conveys the land
excepting the timber to C. B is not estopped to deny A's title to the
land, nor is C estopped to deny A's title to the timber. Gaskins v.
Gray Lumber Co., 6 Ga. App. 167, 64 S.E. 714 (1909). There is a
stronger reason for this holding than that of the principal case,
because the estoppel based on a common source of title applies only
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when both parties claim title to the same property. Sinclair v.
Friedlander,197 Ga. 797, 30 S.E.2d 398 (1944).
In Summerfield v. White, supra, there is a dictum that seems
to support the position of the court in the Toppins case. Plaintiff
claimed under 0, who had owned that tract in fee, while 0 had
owned defendant's tract as a tenant in common. The court said
that since the cotenant of 0 would not be estopped to claim to the
full extent of his deed, even though hostile to an adjoining tract
owned by 0, "... it is apparent that the two titles in question do
not come from the same source.... ." Id. at 321. Again, there would
be a stronger reason for this holding than that of the instant case,
because defendant claimed under the cotenant as well as under 0.
However, it is submitted that the distinction between "common grantor" and "common source' as made in the Toppins case
is the correct and logical rule. When there is a common source of
title, such as an undivided tract subsequently divided, an attack
on part of the title is an attack on the whole, and an estoppel is
proper. But when the common grantor has acquired title to the
adverse tract from a stranger to the title of the other tract, and
has conveyed them as separate tracts, doing nothing to merge the
parcels, the validity of the title to one tract will have no effect on
the validity of the title to the other tract, and neither party should
be estopped to attack the title of the adverse claimant.
C. M. C.

No ENFORCECoNTRAcr.-P owned a tract of land on an island. A contracted

INTRaEBENcE WrrH CoN RAcr-ILAB mTY WHE
ALE

with B construction company to dredge a channel in waters adjoin-

ing P's land. P gave A and B permission to use a strip of his land
for the purpose of depositing the dredged material in a bay adjoining this land. This would have increased the value of P's land.
P alleged that D, having no right to do so, advised B that if it
proceeded to build up P's land with dredged materials, then he,
D, would sue to restrain the operation. In consequence of D's
action, B deposited the materials elsewhere. D filed a demurrer
on the ground that the complaint failed to state a cause of action
for it appeared from the complaint that P had no enforceable contract. Demurrer sustained. Held, that P's complaint failed to state
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